

DATA-SECTION

ATTITUDINAL REFERENTS, STATEMENT-ITEMS AND RESPONSE SET

THE EFFECT OF USING DIFFERENTIAL ITEM-FORMATS ON THE STRUCTURE OF AN  
IDEOLOGICAL DOMAIN

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INTRODUCTION

In developing measuring instruments - or, in our terminology: in conceptualising (theoretical) constructs - social scientists have often been intrigued by the possible effects of stimulus-format, i.e. the effect of the format of the operationalisation of a construct on the data-gathering process and, accordingly, on the results of the analysis (1).

In the early days, psychologists started to investigate the effects of using various item-formats in constructing tests (2). Later, in particular the possible effect of item-format on the phenomenon of 'response set' or acquiescence, decreasing the validity of measuring instruments, was investigated (3). There have been many attempts to "neutralise" this response-set effect. Best known are attempts to construct scales containing 'counter-balanced' items (i.e. item-pairs of similar format and content, but with opposed direction of wording) but the results of such attempts have not been very successful. The major problem was that such item-pairs did not correlate negatively to any worthwhile extent; rather, responses to such item-pairs proved to be unrelated to each other (4). The unsuccessfulness of these attempts has led most researchers to ignore the very phenomenon of response-set, in particular since Rorer's (1965) 'de-mythification' of it.

However, since the mid-nineteensixties, there have at least been two researchers who have made attempts to retackle this problem of measurement. Both Kerlinger (1967, 1972) and Wilson and his associates

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(1973) have carried out studies in which attempts have been made to measure the 'liberal-conservative' (Kerlinger in the United States) or the conservatism domain of attitudes by means of, in Kerlinger's terminology: the 'referents' of attitudes or, in Wilson's terms: 'brief labels or catch-phrases representing various familiar and controversial issues'. The major aim of both researchers was to eliminate response-set effects by means of using this differential item-format.

The major theoretical basis for this new approach to attitude measurement was developed by Kerlinger (1967) in an attempt to theoretically explain the empirical phenomenon that, rather than one liberal-conservative antithesis, there appeared to exist two relatively independent dimensions: a liberal one and a conservative one (see Kerlinger, 1958, 1967a). The following rationale was developed:

- a) The ideological spectrum (in the United States) consists of two sets of 'concepts, ideas, phenomena' (i.e. referents of attitudes): a liberal one and a conservative one.
- b) For most people this broad spectrum is too complex for the development of a consistent pattern of attitudes.
- c) To solve this problem of 'complexity', most people tend to make either of the sets 'criterial', i.e. they develop a consistent attitude towards one set (either positive or negative) but no consistent attitude towards the other set (to the elements in that set, their response-pattern will essentially be random).
- d) Hence there appear two relatively independent dimensions: a liberal one for those for whom the liberal referents are criterial, and a conservative one for those for whom the conservative referents are criterial.

This rationale suggests that the referents of attitudes themselves are better stimuli than statement-items containing one or more referents. This is confirmed in a subsequent study (Kerlinger, 1972) in which such referents were actually used. (Examples of referents are 'religion', 'free enterprise', 'civil rights'.) Obviously, this rationale can explain the phenomenon referred to above (counter-balanced items correlating

approximately zero with each other): such items contain referents from either the liberal or the conservative 'set' (e.g. items used in studies on acquiescence in the F-scale) and to most people only one of those sets is 'criterial'.

Wilson and Nias (in Wilson (ed.), 1973) start off with the suggestion that the very phenomenon of response set is due to the statement-item format, since most statement-items, in their view, are 'multi-dimensional': they contain (a) a 'referent', (b) quantitative terms and (c) evaluative terms. In addition, they are often ambiguous in wording and involve 'multi-negative grammar' (pp. 42-47). Wilson developed a 'new conservatism-scale' from an initial set of 50 referents (Wilson; in Wilson, (ed.), 1973: 49-70) (5). These were, among other sources, derived from a list of characteristics of 'the ideal conservative' (6).

Although the operational and analytical approaches of Kerlinger and Wilson are quite similar (Wilson used both conservative and anti-conservative referents; both use second-order factor-analysis), the obtained results differ substantially from each other. Whereas Kerlinger, as mentioned above, finds two relatively independent factors (a liberal one and a conservative one), Wilson finds two strongly correlated factors, which he labels 'conservative-religious' and 'anti-intellectualistic-racial'. Wilson's results are in line with Ray's finding (in Wilson (ed.), 1973: 64) that liberal statement-items are unrelated to conservative statement-items, but that liberal and conservative referents correlate negatively to each other.

In our opinion there are several possible explanations for these differential results. In the first place, although both Kerlinger and Wilson are aware of the importance of the procedure by means of which the referents are selected, neither of them has defined the theoretical construct they intend to measure in a sufficiently explicit and rigorous way, and neither of them has linked this definition explicitly and clearly to its operationalisation (7). As a consequence, the referents which were actually used by both authors are hardly comparable at all (8). What is clearly needed is a definition of the liberal-conservative (or,



more generally, the progressive-conservative) domain of attitudes and opinions and a clear link of that definition to the referents used in operationalisation and empirical assessment.

Secondly, neither of the authors pays sufficient attention to the sampling of respondents, i.e. sampling some meaningful universe of respondents, such as could be: the general population of a country. If this had been done, the different types of results obtained could perhaps partly be explained in terms of differential political cultures. In the present situation, this is impossible.

Thus, we are left with many unsolved problems. Although the authors discussed above have turned to using referents as stimuli for attitude measurement in order to avoid the expected response-set effect when using statement-items, they have not shown evidence in favor of the proposition that they have been successful in this. In order to be capable of doing so, they should have 'linked' referents to statement-items systematically and, after inspection of the differential results, they should have been able to make it plausible that, in using referents, there appeared no response-set effect whereas this was apparently the case in using statements.

This is exactly one of the purposes of the present study. We will link referents to statements explicitly and assess the differential structures (i.e. the effect of item-format) in two samples drawn from the Dutch population in 1975 (9). We will make an attempt to base our selection of the referents and corresponding statements upon a definition of the progressive-conservative domain of attitudes and opinions.

Our main theoretical interest lies, in the first instance, in the interpretation of the two possibly differential structures of the ideological domain - as a stimulus-format effect. Secondly, we will compare our results to those of Kerlinger and Wilson. Finally, we will discuss the differential effect in terms of 'response-set'.

#### DEFINITION AND OPERATIONALISATIONS OF THE PROGRESSIVE-CONSERVATIVE DOMAIN (10)

The details of the definition of the progressive-conservative domain, by means of the construction of an ideal type model of conservatism as an ideology, cannot be dealt with here in any detail (see Middendorp,

1978: 134-141). This model consists of more than 120 statements about the nature of man and society and their mutual relationship. In order to be capable to use this model in selecting statements for its operationalisation at the attitude-level, it has been analysed in terms of underlying values and their application to the realms of economic and non-economic life. It could be concluded that a progressive attitude 'applies' the value of equality to the economic realm (equality of income, property, life chances etcetera) and the value of freedom to the non-economic realm (e.g. tolerance, permissiveness). Conservative attitudes are the opposit of this: freedom is applied to the economic realm (free enterprise, opposition to government interference) and equality is, in some sense at least, applied to the non-economic realm (e.g. conformism to conventional social norms and to traditional standards of behaviour) (11). (See again Middendorp, 1978: 148-151.)

On the basis of this 'two by two design', 80 referents were constructed and included in a questionnaire to be submitted to a sample from the Dutch population (see below: The Data) (12). For 51 of those 80 referents, statement-items were found in another study which could be linked to a referent in some particular manner.

Eleven types of 'relationship' or 'link' between a referent and a statement-item were distinguished (12a). From the referent-perspective a statement-item could be

- 1) a simple specification (e.g. the referent is: 'aid to developing countries', the statement: 'If everybody would give 1% of his income to aid to developing countries would you think that too much, too little or just about about right?');
- 2) a specification of situation (e.g. the referent is 'social harmony', the statement: 'All groups can live in harmony together without having to change social relations');
- 3) a specification of time (e.g. the referent is 'national health' and the statement is 'Is the health insurance system - "Ziekenfonds" - sufficient at the moment?');
- 4) a specification by contradiction (e.g. the referent is 'public utilities' and the statement: 'In a society based on free enterprise, insufficient attention is usually paid to the necessary public services');

- 5) a specification by implication (e.g. the referent is 'traditions' and the statement is 'The customs and traditions of society are of indispensable value to mankind');
- 6) a specification by means (e.g. the referent is 'equality of opportunity' and the statement is 'Are you in favour or against the government taking radical measures so that everybody will really get equal opportunities of being successful in society');
- 7) a translation (e.g. the referent is 'free abortion' and the statement is 'If a woman so wishes, it should be possible for her to have an abortion'; here the statement does not add anything substantial to the referent);
- 8) a belief-statement (e.g. the referent is 'law and order' and the statement is 'The maintenance of law and order is essential to the sound development of society');
- 9) a bipolar-item (which is an additional format-specification);
- 10) containing the referent itself (another format-specification);
- 11) a qualification (e.g. the referent is 'government care' and the statement is 'Government care from the cradle to the grave will slacken social life').

Of course most referent-statement-item relationships belong to some extent to more than one of the above presented relational types. In fact, four-point scales have predominantly been used to indicate the extent to which each type seemed applicable to every single referent-statement pair of items. In Appendix 1, all of these pairs are presented, with an indication of their predominant relational types, as outlined above.

#### THE DATA

Both studies have been carried out in 1975, and were based on samples from the Dutch population, as has been mentioned before.

The referents were included in one of the weekly surveys carried out by the Netherlands Institute for Public Opinion (NIPO) (13). The statement-items were part of a study carried out by the first mentioned author together with the Social and Cultural Planning Bureau, a department of the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work. Fieldwork

was also carried out by NIPO (14). The sample sizes were N (referents) = 815 and N(statements) = 1927. For the referents, the available response-categories ranged from strong agreement (+3) to strong disagreement (-3) without a neutral category.

#### THE ANALYSES

The analyses were essential exploratory. Although preliminary evidence was available on the structure of both the referents and the statements, we were in search for 'best solutions' (using principal factor-analysis and varimax rotation of the factors) for each set of stimuli, which had not been analysed separately before. Therefore, we rotated two to n factors until a 'best interpretable' solution was found (15). (Only in the final stage we used second-order factor-analysis - as did Kerlinger and Wilson - on the referents, for comparative purposes.)

#### THE STRUCTURES OF THE TWO DOMAINS

Both for the set of referents and for the set of statement-items, the four-factor solutions seemed to be best interpretable (16). Both four-factor solutions, linked to each other, are presented in Table 1 (from the 'referents-perspective') and in Table 2 (from the statements-perspective) which seemed the easiest way to relate both structures to each other, and to get an insight in their differences. The interpretation of the structures is further facilitated by remembering that there are in fact four types of referents and statements: progressive (P) and conservative (C) ones referring to the economic and the non-economic realms (E and NE) respectively (17). We will first discuss the results from the referent-perspective and subsequently from the statement-perspective.

-The first factor in the referents-structure is remarkable in at least two ways: (a) it consists of a mixture of progressive and conservative notions, mainly of the progressive-economic and the conservative-non-economic type, although there are also some referents from each of the other two types (PNE and CE); (b) the statement-items linked to it are dispersed over all factors, mainly the first three. Obviously, this factor cannot be interpreted in terms of 'progressive' versus 'conservative' notions, since both types of notions are loading highly on it, e.g. social equality and private



Table 1 - The structure of the progressive-conservative domain in the Netherlands, 1975; referents versus statements, from the referents-perspective; varimax rotation of principal factors. (a)

ITEM-LABEL (referent) (b)	REFERENTS				STATEMENTS			
Factors	Consensus	Lib-trad	Left-Right	Lib-cons.	Lib-trad	Left-Right	Lib-cons	Change Ex.soc.
equality of opportunity <sup>b)</sup>	.58					.60		
public utilities	.54							
law and order	.51						.41	
freedom of expression	.50				.46			
good manners	.50							
respect for parents	.49				-.54			
national health	.49							
social harmony	.49						.48	
government care	.47						-.45	
social equality	.46					.67		
morality	.45				-.41			
having-a-say (in work-situation)	.44					.47		
workers	.44					.67		
private property	.40						.59	
authority	.38							.45
having-a-say	.36					.36		
social legislation	.36							
sexual freedom		.65			.47			
homosexuals		.62			.43			
free abortion		.60			.35			
demonstrations		.52	.41		.45			
birthcontrol		.46						
emancipation of women		.46						
conscientious objection		.46			.45			
childless couple (voluntarily)		.45			.52			
action groups		.43	.42					
government interference			.52				-.52	
nationalisation big industries			.43					
government price-control			.42			.58		
governm. ownership						.45		
public utilities			.38			.47		
militant trade unions			.36			.65		
income levelling			.35	-.37		.68		
aristocracy				.55			.46	
capitalism				.52			.41	
love of country				.50	-.59			
traditions				.39				
existing economic relations				.38			.42	
film censorship				.37	-.43			
social classes				.36		-.42		
free enterprise				.35			.51	
profit sharing						.70		
higher minimum wage						.66		

ITEM-LABEL (referent) (a)		STATEMENTS			REFERENTS			
Factors	Lib-trad	Left-Right	Lib-Cons	Change Ex. soc.	Consensus	Lib-trad	Left-Right	Lib-Cons
obedience of children	-.66							
love of country	-.59							
respect for parents	-.54				.49			.50
childless couple (voluntarily)	.52					.45		
sexual freedom	.47					.65		
freedom of expression	.46				.50			
conscientious objection	.45					.46		
demonstrations	.45					.52	.41	
homosexuals	.43					.62		
film censorship	-.43							.37
morality	-.41				.45			
free abortion	.35					.60		
profit sharing		.70						
income levelling		.68						
workers		.67					.35	-.37
social equality		.67			.44			
higher minimum wage		.66			.46			
militant trade unions		.65						
equality of opportunity		.60			.58		.36	
nationalisation big industries		.58					.43	
progressive taxation		.54						
having-a-say in work-situation		.47			.44			
governm. ownership public utilities		.47					.38	
government price-control		.45					.42	
governm. aid to education		.43						
social classes	-.42							.36
democratisation	.37							
having-a-say	.36				.36			
private property			.59		.40			
government interference			-.52				.52	
free enterprise			.51					.35
social harmony			.48		.49			
aristocracy			.46					.55
government care			-.45		.47			
existing economic relations			.42					.38
capitalism			.41					.52
law and order			.41		.51			
authority				.45	.38			
modern society				.43				
social change				-.37				
thorough social change				-.35				
public utilities					.54			
emancipation of women						.46		
good manners					.50			
aid to developing countries								
birthcontrol						.46		
action groups						.43	.42	

Table 1 - continued

ITEM-LABEL (referent) (b)	REFERENTS			STATEMENTS				
	Consen- sus	Lib- trad	Left- Right	Lib- Cons.	Lib- trad	Left- Right	Lib- cons	Change Ex. soc
progressive taxation						.54		
democratisation						.37		
governm. aid to education						.43		
obedience of children					-.66			
aid to developing coun- tries								.43
modern society								-.37
social change								-.35
thorough social change								
strong punishment of criminals								

NOTES: a) See Kaiser/1957.

b) Only the referent is presented. For the corresponding statement-items,  
see Appendix.

Table 2 - continued

ITEM-LABEL (referent) (a)	STATEMENTS			REFERENTS				
	Lib- trad	Left- Right	Lib- Cons.	Change Ex. Soc.	Consen- sus	Lib- Trad.	Left- Right	Lib- Cons.
traditions								.39
social legislation					.36			
national health					.49			
strong punishment criminals								

NOTES: a) See notes to Table 1

property, having a say and 'law and order'.

A similar factor has been found in earlier American studies using statement-items and based on samples from the general population. In some early studies (Hartman, 1936:350); Hayes, 1939:395) such a factor was called a 'national-socialist' syndrome since, according to the authors, it combined conservative-nationalist and socialist positions. In a later study (Axelrod, 1967:57) it has been called 'populism'. For the moment we will not label this factor which, at least in the Netherlands in 1975, only comes to the fore when referents are used as stimuli. (Its nature will be discussed below.)

- The next factor is, from the perspective of our four-fold item-typology, quite homogeneous and thus easy to interpret. It has a clearer corresponding statement-item factor: the referents are all from the progressive-non-economic quadrant and may be called libertarian. Both factors may be called libertarian-traditional.
- The same applies to the third factor: the referents are all from the progressive-economic quadrant and there is a clear corresponding statement-item factor. The factors refer to a left-right dimension in the economic field. (Both the second and third referents-factor have, of course, their 'traditional' and 'right-wing' poles, but they do not contain stimuli from those angles.)
- The fourth referents-factor is again somewhat less clear than the former two in that it contains conservative referents of both economic and non-economic nature. Since the economic conservative notions have mainly been borrowed (during the 19th century) from classical economic liberalism (see Middendorp, 1978:119 and 140-141), which is not the case for the non-economic notions such as those on aristocracy and traditions, this factor might be called liberalism-conservatism. (Note that unlike in the United States, liberalism and conservatism do not form an antithesis in Western Europe, at least not economic liberalism and conservatism, which developed during the 19th century in many Western-European countries (18). This factor does not have a clear corresponding statement-item factor.

In conclusion, the structure of the referents is four dimensional, with about 80% of the referents loading .35 or higher on one of



the factors, with very few double loadings and almost complete absence of bipolarity. Three of the four factors are rather easily interpretable: two contain progressive notions and one conservative ones. The progressive notions are divided in economic versus non-economic ones whereas the conservative notions of both types are united on one factor.

What remains to be explained is the first so far unlabeled factor. Obviously, referents (but not statements) are capable of evoking responses to a mixture of progressive and conservative notions which are of similar nature for a majority of individuals. People who tend to agree (or disagree) with such notions as equality of opportunity, public utilities and 'having -a-say' also tend to agree with such notions as 'law and order', good manners and authority. Such notions are obviously incapable of differentiating 'progressives' from 'conservatives': many people seem react consistently (either positively or negatively; see below) to a set of mainly progressive-economic and conservative non-economic notions.

One interpretation of this factor, which is obviously, from the progressive-conservative perspective, of non-ideological nature (18a) could be that it reflects notions on which CONSENSUS has been reached to a large extent within Dutch political culture. Many notions in this factor seem to be very general and non-controversial, e.g. equality of chances, public utilities, freedom of expression, etcetera. The rationale could be that those notions, having been drawn from the domain of progressive and conservative ideological controversy, have during more recent times, perhaps, lost their controversial meaning and are now generally agreed upon. If this factor indeed reflects ideas and notions on which a large amount of consensus has been reached, then this factor reflects that portion of previous ideological debate which has become de-ideologized and thus become part of the 'shared' political culture. According to some, such a shared political culture is a necessary prerequisite to parliamentary democracy (see e.g. Lipset, 1960) or even for any political system to be able to function (see e.g. Easton, 1965: ch. 10, 12, 13).

There has been a lack of agreement amongst scholars as to the extent to which there should be consensus in a political culture in order for a parliamentary democracy to 'work' and there has also been no agreement

as to the exact nature of this presupposed consensus. Prothro and Grigg (1969) and McClosky (1964) have shown that in the general population such agreement only exists as far as abstract principles are concerned; it no longer exists when such principles are 'applied' in more specific terms. In the present study, we have presented evidence in favor of this: if our rationale is correct, consensus appears when using abstract referents as stimuli; it disappears when using the corresponding statement-items as stimuli (19). At least some referents - from both progressive and conservative heritage - can be used as 'slogans' which have a general appeal to the electorate.

Before testing this hypothesis, we will have a somewhat closer look on the differences between the two structures by inspecting Table 2: The structure seen from the statement-items perspective. Here, we see that the strongest factor is the left-right factor using economic statements on many aspects of (mainly) government policy with egalitarian implications. One third of the statement-items has corresponding referents on the left-wing referents-factor, but another third loads on what we have suggested above might be called the consensus-referents factor. For some statements, the corresponding referent does not load on any factor. (There is no correspondence between the type of link between statements and referents, and the differential loading patterns.)

A similar phenomenon appears for the other two major statement-item factors. The bipolar libertarianism-traditionalism statement-factor has most corresponding referents loading on the corresponding factor, but some are again on the consensus-factor. We see that the statement-items also yield a liberal-conservative factor which in terms of the referents, is slightly bipolar. The statement-items - which are all in bipolar format - clearly reflect a liberal-conservative syndrome of 'abstract-philosophical' nature (20).

Finally, we may note that (a) there is a small statement-factor which does not have a corresponding referent-factor (it seems to reflect relatively non-ideological notions on 'change' and 'society' with a bipolar item on 'authority') and (b) many referents have corresponding statements which do not load on any factor. The former finding is in line with earlier results: 'attitude to change' is neither

a conservative nor any other ideological posture. It is relatively independent from the major ideological dimensions (see Middendorp 1978:221).

#### SOME NOTES ON VALIDITY

First, we will investigate whether our interpretation of the so-called consensus factor is correct. We can test several hypotheses in doing so. If this factor is indeed tapping a set of notions on which there exists large-scale consensus in Dutch political culture, then we can predict two things:

- (a) the mean score for the population at large on the factor should be relatively high, which would also imply a relatively small standard-deviation;
- (b) the factor should show weak relationships to self-assigned ideological postures, such as left-wing, conservative, etcetera.

Both predictions are borne out. Consensus has been measured by means of a scale ranging from 0-9; the mean score is 7.62 with a standard-deviation of 1.04. 86.5% of the population scores 7, 8 or 9 on the scale. For the other factors the mean scores are around 5.0 with standard-deviations ranging from 1.25 to 1.95. The average correlation to self-assigned ideological positions is .08, the only substantial one being .21 to traditional, which is more or less in line with the rationale: traditionalists score high on consensus, which has become part of 'traditional' culture. The other referent-factors show much higher correlations to self-assigned ideological postures. All have their strongest relationship to, roughly speaking, the ideology which comes 'closest' to the meaning of the factor, e.g. 'left-wing' and the left-right factor, 'progressive' and the libertarianism-factor (21).

The same is true for the statement-item factors, which generally show somewhat higher correlations, however (22). Here the small factor on 'change' and 'existing society' does not show any substantial relationship.

Additional evidence in favor of the validity of the referents- and statements-dimensions has been obtained by relating the factors

to political party preference (vote intention 'if there were elections for parliament now'). For the corresponding referents- and statements-factors, the usual patterns were found:

- (1) the extreme left-wing parties (Pacifist Socialists and Communists) are most left-wing and libertarian and least liberal-conservative;
- (2) Labour party voters follow the same pattern, but somewhat more moderate with the exception of the middle-position of Labour-voters on libertarianism;
- (3) Democrats (D'66) and Radicals (PPR) are moderately left-wing, but strongly libertarian and somewhat more anti-liberal-conservative than Labour voters;
- (4) Christian-Democrats (KVP, CHU and ARP, the CDA is a combination of these three traditional parties) (23) are middle-of-the road as far as left-right is concerned, but most traditional (anti-libertarian) and moderately on the liberal-conservative side;
- (5) the traditional liberal party voters (the VVD) are most right-wing and liberal-conservative, but in a middle position (together with Labour Party voters) as far as libertarianism is concerned;
- (6) with the exception of the libertarianism-traditionalism dimension, the liberal voters take a similar position as the voters on the extreme-righthand side of the Dutch political spectrum: the SGP, the GPV and the Farmers Party (BP) (24).

The consensus-factor and the statements-factor on change and existing society do not show any relationship to voting behaviour. On the corresponding referents - and statements-factors, the rankorderings of the voters are almost exactly the same (25). Again, the voters can be differentiated slightly better on the basis of the statement-item dimensions, but the differences are not very substantial.

#### THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FACTORS

The relations between the factors have been assessed in two different ways. First, we will discuss the relations between the factors as assessed by means of summated scores of highly loading referents and statement-items respectively on the orthogonal varimax-factors, which



we have discussed above (26). Secondly, for the referents, the inter-correlations between first-order promax-factors and the results of second-order factor-analysis will be discussed for reasons of comparison with the work of Kerlinger and Wilson, referred to above.

(a) The Tau-beta coefficients for the correlations between the dimensions are presented in Table 3. We can easily see that although we have found that the corresponding dimensions show very similar relationships to major validating variables, their mutual relationships are not so similar. For the statement-item dimensions, the left-right dimension is most strongly related to the liberal-conservative dimension whereas for the referents-dimensions, it is most strongly related to libertarianism-traditionalism (Tau's are .34 and .42 respectively). The other inter-correlations in both matrices are considerably lower and can largely be ignored except for a moderate correlation of .18 between libertarianism-traditionalism and liberal-conservatism for the statements, and .16 for left-right and consensus for the referents. (It should be remarked that the differential associations for the left-right factor remain so when the referents-factor and the statements-factor are measured only on the basis of corresponding referent-statement pairs.) We will not make an attempt to explain these findings here. Their importance lies in the fact that differential item-formats may not only yield (partially) dissimilar factor structures, with unique factors associated to a certain item-format, but that, even to the extent that the factors are similar and can be labeled in a similar way, the relationship between such factors may still be quite different.

(b) The correlations between the first-order promax-factors for the referents are presented in Table 4; the loadings on the two second-order factors (unrotated and after using promax-rotation) are presented in Table 5. As usual, the first-order promax-factors were very similar to the varimax-factors (27). Notice that the Pearson-correlations between the promax-factors differ from the Tau's based on summated scores of highly loading referents on the varimax-factors. The highest loading remains the one between left-right and libertarianism-traditionalism, but we see that the promax-factors of liberalism-conservatism and libertarianism-traditionalism correlate higher than using summated

Table 3 - The relations between the dimensions in the progressive-conservative domain, as assessed by means of referent-versus statement-items (a)

	REFERENTS				STATEMENTS			
	CONS	LIB- TRAD	LEFT- RIGHT	LIB- CONS	LIB- TRAD	LEFT- RIGHT	LIB- CONS	CHANGE EX. SOC.
Consensus		-.10	-.16					
Libertarian-traditional			<u>.42</u>	.12		.11	.18	-.07
Left-right				.12			<u>.34</u>	-.06
Liberal-conservative								.04
Change-existing society								

NOTE: a) Coefficients are Tau-beta's. Measurement of the dimensions by means of summated standardised scores (Z-scores) on highly loading ( $\geq .35$ ) items. Scales have been recoded to 10-point scales. Scoring has been in the right-wing, traditional and liberal-conservative direction.

Table 4 - Correlations between first-order promax-factors based on the referent-items

	CONSENSUS	LIBERTARIAN- TRADITIONAL	LEFT- RIGHT	LIBERAL- CONSERVATIVE
Consensus		+.06	+.22	+.12
Libertarian-traditional			.27	-.24
Left-right				-.09
Liberal-conservative				

NOTE: Scoring has been in the left-wing, libertarian and liberal-conservative direction

Table 5 - The unrotated and obliquely rotated two-factor second-order factor-analytical solutions for the referents-structure

	UNROTATED		ROTATED	
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 1	Factor 2
Consensus	-.25	+.47	+.07	+.51
Libertarian-traditional	-.55	-.15	-.53	+.25
Left-right	-.54	+.19	-.33	+.50
Liberal-conservative	+.32	+.43	+.51	+.11

NOTE: The correlation between the rotated factors is .11.

scores and Tau-beta's. The same is true for consensus and left-right.

In Table 5, we see that the unrotated 2-factor second-order solution reflects the highest correlation between left-right and libertarianism: both load highly on the first factor, whereas consensus and liberalism-conservatism load highly on the second factor. However, since these two first-order factors are only slightly correlated (.12), this solution is drastically altered after rotation of factors. After oblique rotation, there appear two other factors, one with highest loadings for consensus and left-wing, the other with highest loadings for libertarianism (negative) and liberalism-conservatism. The high correlation between left-right and libertarianism is 'overruled' by the two slightly lower correlations between left-right and consensus, and liberal-conservative and libertarianism-traditionalism, respectively. This highest correlation is only reflected in low loadings for left-right on the first factor, and for libertarianism on the second one. The two second-order promax-factors are only slightly correlated (.11).

At first sight, these results appear to be somewhat in favour of Kerlinger's finding of two orthogonal second-order factors, as opposed to Wilson et. al.'s two highly correlated factors, as we discussed briefly in the introductory paragraph. The unrotated second-order 2-factor structure in Table 5 comes closest to a confirmation of Kerlinger's theory. In that unrotated solution, there is clearly a progressive factor (the first order libertarian and left-wing referents-factors load on the first second-order factor) and an at least partially conservative factor (the second factor, with high loadings for liberalism-conservatism and..... the consensus-factor). The question is, however, to which extent can the consensus-factor be considered as a conservative factor? We have seen that people scoring high on the consensus-factor also tend to consider themselves to be rather traditional. In that sense, this factor could be considered as being built up from attitudes towards notions which have become 'traditional', at least in Dutch political culture, and hence as a 'conservative' orientation. But from the 'theoretical' progressive-conservative domain, this factor cannot be considered as either progressive or conservative, and hence, the second second-order factor cannot be considered as a 'conservative' or 'traditional' factor.

Rotation of second-order factors yields a quite different picture. However, this is even more remote from the Kerlinger rationale since the first factor is bipolar, a phenomenon which is excluded by Kerlinger's theory. This factor is a combination of libertarian and liberal-conservative notions which are negatively related to each other, whereas consensus is positively related to left-wing referent-stimuli.

#### DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY

In this study we have tested the effects of stimulus-format in assessing the structure of an ideological domain. In one study referents of attitudes were used as a stimuli; in the other, the usual statement-item format was used. Contrary to other studies in which the referents of attitudes were used as stimuli (i.e. the studies of Kerlinger (1972) and Wilson et. al., (1973), we have (a) selected our stimuli on the basis of a thorough definition of the progressive-conservative domain of attitudes and opinions, (b) linked referents to statements in a systematic and explicit way, and (c) based our analysis on data from samples from the general (Dutch) population. Although similar analytical techniques were applied, our results differ from those obtained in the other studies.

The outstanding effect of using referents as stimuli (referents being 'abstract', general slogans, concepts) has proven to be the appearance of a unique factor which has been interpreted as a consensus-factor. Validating evidence in favour of this interpretation has been given. There appears to be a relatively large number of concepts and ideas (often implying goals for public policy, but also general orientations towards social relations or the immediate social context in which the individual lives, e.g. equality of opportunity, law and order, good manners, respect for parents, national health, morality, having-a-say in work, authority, to mention a few) which have been derived from both progressive and conservative postures, or even from liberal, conservative and socialist ideologies, but with respect to which there now seems to exist a large amount of consensus in Dutch political culture.

The appearance of a consensus-factor cutting across traditional divisions of opinion and attitude-formation within ideological domains



only when using referents as stimuli (the corresponding statement-items load almost evenly divided on all three other major statement-item factors!) is an important phenomenon, in particular in the context of ideological debate and e.g. in the context of election-campaigns. We could introduce this line of reasoning as follows.

(a) There appears to be a 'theoretical' progressive-conservative unidimensional antithesis, which is empirically the major basis for party-divisions at the elite level, i.e. the level of Members of Parliament (see Middendorp. 1978:204. 246) (28).

(b) In the electorate ('at the mass level') there appears to be a multi-dimensional structure, as again found in the present study: at both the referent- and at the statement item level there appear to be overlapping and similar, though not identical dimensions which could be labeled 'left-right', 'libertarian-traditional' and 'liberal-conservative'.

(c) Although, apart from the consensus-factor, we find similar dimensions in the Dutch population when using referents versus statements as stimuli, the relationships between these similar dimensions are quite different from each other. (For the moment we leave aside the unique but very small 'modern society-social change' factor for the statement-items.)

It has sometimes been noted - and found in empirical research - that people's ideological postures are only of modest significance in voting behaviour. The findings summarised above suggest why this might be the case.

Firstly, many voters may easily find themselves in cross-pressured situations as far as they are aware of their ideological stands related to those of the major political parties. Assuming that the various 'parties' have positions which are consistent in terms of left- or right-wing, libertarian versus traditional, and liberal-conservative versus opposed stands (left-wing party-elites tend to be libertarian and opposed to liberal-conservative positions and vice versa), many groups of voters face dilemmas since they might be e.g. left-wing but relatively traditional (i.e. working class Labour-party voters) or right-wing and relatively libertarian (i.e. upper-class liberal voters).

The important point here is that the consensus-factor may increase ideological confusion since, in terms of referents (i.e. catch-phrases or slogans) all parties could use both the progressive (socialist) and conservative (including liberal) notions in the consensus-dimension, which have a general appeal to the electorate: Hence, it is made even

more difficult for 'ordinary' voters to make a distinction (in terms of progressive or conservative) among the parties, and relate this to their own ideological posture and, consequently, to voting behaviour.

The most relevant point here is that all this only comes to the fore when using referents of attitudes as stimuli. This seems to be the major advantage of using referents: they are obviously able to show that there is an 'end to ideology' in terms of fundamental divisions: some notions derived from the basic ideological orientations have acquired a status of common agreement, and have thus become de-ideologized.

Finally, we must return to our original question: have we found evidence in favor of the postulation that referents, contrary to statements, are not (or less) susceptible to response set or acquiescence? Assuming that a phenomenon such as response set is actually operating, we have, at first sight at least, collected evidence to the contrary! It is in the referents-structure that a phenomenon has been found which could be interpreted in terms of acquiescence: the consensus-factor. It is on this factor that respondents tend to respond positively to both progressive and conservative notions. This is contrary to evidence presented by Ray (in Wilson (ed.) 1973:64) referred to above, that whereas liberal (progressive) and conservative statements tend to correlate zero, liberal and conservative referents tend to correlate negatively to each other. However, to the extent that the consensus-factor could be interpreted in terms of response-set, we have at the same time shown that at best there is only a differential tendency for respondents to do so: they seem to show acquiescence towards some referents stimuli but not to most of them! This makes an interpretation of the consensus-factor in terms of acquiescence very doubtful, since this interpretation could not explain why there would be response set in some cases but not in others. Our earlier interpretation in terms of commonly accepted elements in the political culture seems more probable and acceptable. We have shown, moreover, that response patterns are more complicated than being explainable in terms of a 'simple' response set: the ideological structure is at least three- or four-dimensional rather than one- or two-dimensional.

In conclusion, we have found no evidence in favor of Kerlinger's position that, since attitudinal structures can be interpreted in terms of the criteriality of attitudinal referents, the referents themselves would be better stimuli than statement-items. We agree with Kerlinger that the fact that dimensions within the progressive-conservative domain prove to be relatively independent from each other cannot be interpreted in terms of response set, as indicated above. We have found no evidence in favor of Wilson et.al.'s position that, when using referents as stimuli, response set is outruled and two strongly correlated factors would be found. At first sight, the consensus-factor could be interpreted in terms of acquiescence - contrary to the Wilson-position - but since the response set rationale cannot explain an item-specific tendency to do so, our alternative explanation in terms of consensus in the political culture seems preferable.

The introduction of referents as stimuli for the measurement of ideological dimensions has been useful from this perspective - highlighting the existence of consensus-elements in the political culture of a nation, which can be seen as essential to parliamentary democracy and even to the functioning of any political system. At the same time, we have outlined the rationale that the consensus factor might increase ideological confusion by further complicating the already complex three-dimensional ideological domain. Some progressive and conservative notions can be used by all parties in attempts to attract voters, e.g. in election campaigns.

Of course our study has its limitations. In the first place, it is limited to the Dutch population and awaits cross-cultural confirmation and validation. Secondly, we are well aware of the fact that final interpretations of the differential effects of stimulus format on the structure of an ideological domain can only be assessed by means of a study in which both referents and statement-items - systematically linked to each other - are combined in one analytical design.



FOOTNOTES

1. Terminology may be confusing. We define a construct as a theoretical construction or: concept, and its conceptualisation as both its operationalisation (in one or more formats) and its empirical assessment and analysis (in one or several sampled universes). For more details, see Middendorp (1978).
2. We refer here to the work of e.g. Thurstone (1928, 1934), Likert (1932), Pace (1939) and Vetter (1930).
3. See, e.g. Chapman and Campbell (1957, 1959), Cloud and Vaughan (1970), Cough and Kenniston (1969) and many others.
4. See, e.g. Christie, Havel and Seidenberg (1958), Berkowitz and Wolkon (1964), Green and Goldfield (1965) and Ray (1973).
5. Note that, from here on, we will use the term 'referents' although Wilson et. al. do not use this term.
6. Note that this is an advisable approach as will become clear below. It is unclear, however, how Wilson's 'ideal conservative' has been constructed (see Wilson (ed.), 1973:5-9).
7. Although Kerlinger (1972) does not use an 'ideal type' approach, as did Wilson, he mentions to have collected referents from the works of some well known liberal and conservative authors, such as Rossiter (1962), Kirk (1960), Viereck (1962), McClosky (1958), Hartz (1955) and Orton (1945) (see Kerlinger, 1972:616). The selection process is not made explicit, however.
8. Compare Wilson (1973:52) and Kerlinger (1972:622) The major difference is perhaps that Wilson includes only one socio-economic referent, and this one is a very general and abstract one: 'socialism'. In addition, he uses very peculiar ones such as 'horoscopes', 'cousin marriage', 'computer music', 'women judges', 'learning Latin' and 'pyjama parties' (see also Kerlinger, 1978:27). Kerlinger uses referents such as mentioned in the text above and, in addition, educational referents such as 'pupil personality', 'school discipline' there is an 'educational bias' in Kerlinger's work .
9. This prevents 'distortions' of the structure under the influence of specific characteristics of samples. For evidence that in e.g. higher educated groups the structure of attitudes is less



interpretable than in either the population at large or some political elite, see again Middendorp (1978:199 and 238), and Middendorp and De Vries (1980). The same applies to politically interested groups. Kerlinger's and Wilson's samples often seem to be over-represented among the higher educated.

10. We use the terms 'progressive' and 'conservative' since this domain seems to be the broadest 'ideological' one in Western Europe. The term 'progressive' is roughly similar to what, in the United States, is called 'liberal'. For a comparison between European and American conservatism see e.g. Rossiter (1962) and Middendorp (1978:126-130). The concept of 'ideology' will not be discussed in this context (see again Middendorp 1978:102-106). For more details on the methodology behind this approach, see Middendorp (1978:Ch. 2). The model of conservatism is developed in Chapter 4, operationalised in Chapter 5 and empirically assessed in Chapter 6.
11. Conformism to traditional norms can be seen as 'equality' in terms of 'everybody should conform to the applicable rules' although these rules may be different for different persons, and in different situations. In the non-economic realm, the values of freedom and equality have the same implications if 'equality' is applied to actual variations in behaviour, which are considered being of 'equal value'.
12. The referents were developed in close cooperation with Professor Kerlinger, at that time and until recently at the University of Amsterdam. They were partly inspired by statement-items in the earlier study by Middendorp (1978). Results have been published in several previous articles (Kerlinger et. al.(1976); Kerlinger (1978);Middendorp,(1978a).
- 12.a We will not discuss the way these eleven types of relationship have been developed. They are mentioned in the text as an illustration of our systematic approach explicitly 'linking' statements to referents.
13. See also Kerlinger et. al. (1976). The weekly NIPO-surveys do not use a call-back system in approaching potential respondents and are rather heavily clustered. Women are overrepresented.

14. This sample was designed by Middendorp in collaboration with NIPO and the Social and Cultural Planning Bureau. For details see Middendorp (1979:179).
15. What the best solution is was decided on theoretical grounds, not on statistical criteria. We attempted to find 'best solutions' with the same number of factors for both sets of stimuli.
16. We have systematically compared the 2, 3, 4, 5 etcetera factor-solutions, but will not present all comparative results here, for reasons of space and relevance.
17. This is an alternative 2-by-2 approach to the underlying structure, which has been defined earlier in terms of two values (freedom and equality) as applied to two fields (economic versus non-economic). Progressive-economic is: the value of equality applied to the economic realm; progressive-non-economic is the value of freedom applied to the non-economic realm, etcetera.
18. Here again there is the possibility of terminological confusion. American readers might find a liberal-conservative syndrome contradictory in terminology, or they might associate it with what Axelrod (1967) has labeled 'populism'. For the rationale that liberalism and conservatism have at various points in time, to various degrees and in various manners, become a more or less integrated ideological position in many Western-European countries, the reader is again referred to Middendorp (1978: 115-122). American conservatism, to a large extent, is similar to classical economic Western-European liberalism (see e.g. Rossiter (1962) and Hartz (1955), Free and Cantril (1967)).
- 18.a Some people, notably in the marxist tradition, might argue that the fact that certain ideas are generally shared, is in itself no evidence in favor of the non-ideological nature of those ideas. Such scholars might argue that this circumstance should make us suspicious of the possibility that, behind the consensus of opinion, the interests of specific groups (i.e.: class interests) could be concealed. Ideological ideas need not be controversial themselves; rather, the interests they conceal are controversial; cf Ritsert, (1977), Kolakowski, (1978, I :153-176) and for a more complex approach: Althusser, (1971:127-186). In the context of this paper, however, we stick to the more modest definition of ideology as developed in

Middendorp (1978:107,256) since it is difficult to formulate the possible (class-) interests that might be 'concealed' by the rather heterogeneous set of referents in the consensus factor.

19. Kerlinger (1972) uses the same rationale referring to the general, abstract nature of the referents in explaining the relatively high level of agreement with them. In our study, we may have found two sets of referents: one for which agreement is extremely high, others for which it is (much) lower. Evidence is to be presented below.
20. In another study (Middendorp, 1978), these liberal and conservative bipolar items loaded on different factors and, when combined in two scales, liberalism loaded negatively on the left-right factor of attitude scales. From that perspective the liberal-conservative factor found in this analysis at the single-item level is somewhat surprising. Obviously, liberal items (statements) are stronger related to conservative statements than to left-wing statements, whereas at the scale-level, it is the other way around.
21. The above mentioned results have been obtained by means of measurements on the basis of 9-points scales which have been constructed by means of recoding summated scores on highly loading referents.
22. The statement-factors have been measured by means of standardised summated scores, i.e. summated Z-scores. The higher correlations for the statement-factors and the self-assigned ideological postures could partly be explained by the fact that in that study, the ideological positions have been measured differently, i.e. by means of bipolar positions and an indication of preference-position by respondents inbetween those poles, e.g. between progressive and conservative, left-wing versus right-wing, etcetera.
23. We will not go here into any detail as regards the rather complicated Dutch Party-structure and its recent developments, of which the combination of the former Roman-Catholic Peoples Party, and the two Protestant parties (the Anti-Revolutionary Party - Calvinist - and the Christian-Historical Union - Dutch-Reformed) in the Christian-Democratic Appeal (CDA) is most important.
24. SGP and GPV are right-wing and traditional religious (extreme-Calvinist) parties.

25. The rank-orderings are similar to those obtained by e.g. Middendorp (1978:209, 253) and thus enhance confidence in validity.
26. Again, scores have been standardised before summation (see note 22 above). As is well known, scores thus summated on orthogonal factors will not be orthogonal to each other. (See also note 27.)
27. Thus, there was no necessity to reinterpret the promax-first-order factor-structure. This finding is rather common (see Middendorp, 1978:271, note 2). For the promax-rotation procedure, see Hendrickson and White (1964).
28. It remains to be seen, of course, whether, when using referents as stimuli, such a unidimensional structure will reappear in a sample from political elites.



Appendix: The statement-items linked to the referents, with an indication of the predominant type(s) of relationship

NR	REFERENT	STATEMENT (a)	PREDOMINANT RELATIONSHIP(S) (b)
04	governm. aid to education	The government should make education entirely cost-free up till the age of 18.	1
05	democratisation	Do you think that the student's say in the management of the university should (greatly increase....greatly lessened)	1
08	government price-contr.	The government should firmly control prices after wage increases.	2,7
09	action groups	Should one be free to occupy buildings (e.g. schools, universities) in order to enforce justified demands?	1,6
10	traditions	The customs and traditions of society are of indispensable value to mankind (vs. opposit; bipolar item).	5,8
12	profit sharing	The government should make it obligatory that employees share in the profits to the same degree that the shareholders do.	1,4,6
13	social classes	The existence of social classes is unjust (versus opposit; bipolar item).	8
15	having-a-say	Do you think that the citizen's say in the government of towns and provinces should (greatly increase... greatly lessened).	7
16	sexual freedom	Suppose a married man has a love affair with another woman, do you think that this is totally unacceptable or is it justified in certain cases.	1
17	love of country	Instilling patriotism in pupils is an important educational task.	6
19	social legislation	Tell me whether the social security provisions mentioned are sufficient or insufficient at the moment: 'Old age pensions'.	1
21	national health	As 19: 'Ziekenfonds' (Obligatory health insurance)	1,3
23	aid to developing count	If everybody would give up 1% of his income for aid to develop. countries, would you think that too much, too little or just about right?	1,6
25	free enterprise	If freedom of enterprise is restricted, other freedoms will also disappear (versus opposit; bipolar item)	5,8
26	existing econ.relat.	From an economic point of view, the existing social relations are inevitable (versus opposit; bipolar item)	8

Appendix - continued

NR	REFERENT	STATEMENT (a)	PREDOMINANT RELATIONSHIP (b)
27	aristocracy	It is necessary that a small group of able men exercise authority in order to realize a sound society (versus opposit; bipolar)	8
29	obedience of children	The most important thing children should learn is total obedience to their parents wishes.	8
30	free abortion	If a woman so wishes, it should be possible for her to have an abortion.	7
31	higher minimum wage	The government should allow for the minimum income to rise more sharply than other income levels.	6
32	homosexuals	Do you think that homosexuals should be left as free as possible to live their own life, or do you feel that this should be opposed as much as possible?	7
33	childless couple (voluntarily)	A married couple decides on principle not to have children although there are no medical objections. Can you approve of such a point of view or do you think it is unacceptable?	7
36	film censorship	Film-censorship should be abolished	7
38	nationalisation big industries	The government should nationalise large industries and firms.	7
39	demonstrations	Should one be free to demonstrate for or against something?	7
40	government interference	A great deal of government interference can only lead to bureaucracy and economic stagnation (versus opposit; bipolar item)	5,8
46	government ownership public utilities	The government should itself exploit natural resources like oil and natural gas	1
48	public utilities	In a society based on private enterprise insufficient attention is usually paid to the necessary public services (vs. opposit; bipolar item)	4,5,8
49	equality of opportunity	Are you in favor or against the government taking radical measures so that everybody will really get equal opportunities of being successful in society	6
50	progressive taxation	The government should (sharply increase...sharply decrease) taxes on higher incomes	7
51	freedom of expression	Should one be free to write whatever one likes in public?	1
52	morality	In some people's opinion the morals and and behaviour in our country are degenerating, more and more; others find that, on the contrary, they are improving. What is your opinion?	2,3,8

Appendix - continued

NR	REFERENT	STATEMENT (a)	PREDOMINANT RELATIONSHIP (b)
53	private property	Private enterprise is essential to economic growth (versus opposit: should be restricted by government; bipolar item)	5,6,8
54	modern society	What is your opinion of society today? (favourable...unfavourable)	1,3,7
55	law and order	The maintenance of law and order is essential to sound development of society (versus opposit; bipolar item)	5,8
57	social change	Do you want the existing society in our country on the whole to remain as it is, to change a little or to change a great deal?	2,3,7
58	social equality	Differences in class should be smaller than is the case at present	1,8
60	birthcontrol	To check the population expansion, birthcontrol should be strongly advocated	2,5,6
62	strong punishment	Criminals should not be punished in the first instance but one should attempt to change their ways	4,8
63	income-levelling	Are you in favor or against the government taking radical measures to reduce the differences in income-levels?	6
69	government care	Government care from the cradle to the grave leads to a slackened way of life (vs. opposit; bipolar item)	5,8
74	thorough social change	A better society can only be realized through a radical change of the present social structure (versus opposit; bipolar)	8
76	good manners	Ill-mannered people cannot expect decent people to want to mix with them	4
77	emancipation of women	It is not as important for a girl to get a good schooling as it is for a boy	8
78	capitalism	Human needs are generally best satisfied in a capitalist society (versus opposit; bipolar item)	5,8
79	social harmony	All social groups can live together in harmony without having to change social relations (versus opposit; bipolar item)	2,5,8
80	having-a-say (in work-situation)	Do you want worker's participation in the management of firms to increase, to remain as it is or to decrease?	7
81	militant trade-unions	Trade unions should pursue a more vigorous policy if they really want to promote the interests of employees and labores.	5

Appendix - continued

NR	REFERENT	STATEMENT (a)	PREDOMINANT RELATIONSHIP (b)
82	authority	The freedom of many people is limited by existing authority (versus opposit; bipolar item)	5,8
84	workers	Workers must still struggle for an equal social position	2,8
85	respect for parents	It goes without saying that children show respect for their parents	7

NOTES: a) For reasons of space, response categories are not made explicit, but are mostly clear from the question-format (see Middendorp, 1978)

b) The numbers refer to the categories as described in the text.

Briefly, 1 = simple specification;

2 = specification of situation;

3 = specification of time;

4 = specification by contradiction;

5 = specification by implication;

6 = specification by means;

7 = translation;

8 = belief-statement.

Categories 9, 10 and 11 are not referred to; 9 and 10 are evident from the text of the items.

The numbers in the right-hand column refer to the highest score(s) given to statements as regards the nature of their relationship to the referent. Those scores could vary between 0 and 3. Thus, in most cases, the numbers refer to the type of relationship(s) which had been assigned a score of 3. Other relationships are mostly present, but, in the opinion of the authors, to a lesser extent.

Bipolar items have 7-point scales between the two poles. Agree-disagree type of items have 5-point scales.



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